We argue that automation has contributed to sluggish wage growth despite historically low unemployment rates in the most recent decade. This argument is based on a quantitative general equilibrium framework that incorporates automation decisions. If a job opening is not filled with a worker, a firm can choose to automate that position and use a robot instead of a worker to produce output. The threat of automation strengthens the firm's bargaining power against job seekers in wage negotiations, suppressing wages in economic expansions. The option to automate also raises the value of a vacancy, boosting the incentive for job creation, and thereby amplifying fluctuations in vacancies and unemployment. Our mechanism helps account for the large fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies relative that in real wages, a puzzling observation through the lens of the standard labor search models.
I. Introduction
Despite the longest economic expansion and the lowest unemployment rate in recent U.S. history, wage growth has been subdued since the Great Recession (Krueger, 2018) . Accompanying these developments in the labor market, recent advances in robotics and artificial intelligence have raised concerns that automation might put an increasing share of workers at risk of losing their jobs. There is an on-going debate about whether automation reduces overall employment (Autor, 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017) . But workers may have become more reluctant to ask for pay increases in a tight labor market, if they perceive their jobs as being more at risk of automation.
In this paper, we develop and estimate a general equilibrium framework to assess the quantitative impact of automation on wages and employment. Our analysis highlights a novel channel through which automation drives labor market fluctuations: the ability to automate, or the "threat of automation," provides an outside option to firms in wage negociations, effectively raising their bargaining power. The automation threat creates a source of real wage rigidity that mutes wage increases during economic expansions, while boosting employment. The predictions of our estimated model are consistent with the strong labor markets and muted wage growth observed during the later part of the recovery from the Great Recession. More broadly, our model helps explain the large fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies relative to that in real wages in the data, a puzzling observation through the lens of the standard labor search models (Shimer, 2005) .
Our framework builds on the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model with labor market search frictions and generalizes it to incorporate automation decisions. In line with Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Zeira (1998) , firms in our model first make a choice of technologies (adopting or not adopting a robot); and only non-automated tasks (or vacancies) are available for hiring workers. 1 Consumption goods can be produced using either a worker or a robot. In the beginning of each period, a firm observes an i.i.d. cost of automation and decides whether or not to automate an unfilled job position that is carried over from the previous period. If the cost of automation lies below a threshold determined by the net benefit of automation, then the firm adopts a robot for production and takes the job vacancy offline. The probability of automation is thus the cumulative density of the automation cost draws evaluated at the automation threshold.
If the job position is not automated, then the firm posts the vacancy in the labor market to search for a potential match with a job seeker. If the match is successful, the vacancy will be filled with a worker and both the firm and the worker obtain their respective employment surplus from bargaining over the wage rate. If no match is formed, then the vacancy remains open and the firm obtains the continuation value of the vacancy, including the option to automate the position in future periods. 2 Our approach to modeling automation decisions requires a job vacancy to carry a positive value in equilibrium. Unlike the standard DMP model with free entry, we introduce a fixed 1 We interpret automation as a labor-saving technology. In this sense, the stock of automatons (or robots) are different from the stock of physical capital in the standard business cycle models. 2 We interpret a job position broadly as consisting of a bundle of tasks, which are ex ante identical, but a fraction of which will be automated depending on the realization of the idiosyncratic costs of automation.
This approach simplifies our analysis significantly. We have considered an alternative timing of the automation decisions, under which firms first post the job vacancies for hiring workers, and then decide whether or not to automate the unfilled vacancies. The results are similar. cost of vacancy creation. A firm will choose to create a new vacancy if the vacancy-creation cost (drawn from an i.i.d. distribution) is below the value of the vacancy. Since vacancy creation is costly, an unfilled vacancy carries a positive value, allowing the firm to choose whether or not to automate an unfilled vacancy. Furthermore, different from the standard DMP model where the number of vacancies is a jump variable, it becomes a slow-moving state variable in our setup, enabling the model to match the persistent vacancy dynamics in the data (Leduc and Liu, 2019) . Importantly, an increase in the value of a vacancy raises the firm's reservation value in wage negotiations, putting downward pressures on equilibrium wages. We estimate the model to fit quarterly U.S. time series data. These time series include unemployment, vacancies, real wage growth, and nonfarm business sector labor productivity growth, with a sample ranging from 1985:Q1 to 2018:Q4. To fit these four time series, we assume four shocks in our model, including a discount factor shock, a neutral technology shock, an automation-specific shock, and a job separation shock. We find that matching the observed fluctuations in labor productivity is an important disciplining device on the endogenous automation mechanism, especially because of the slowdown in productivity growth since the mid-2000s (Fernald, 2015) . In our estimated model, we find that automation amplifies employment fluctuations. Automation has a direct job-displacing effect since goods produced by robots are perfect substitutes for goods produced by workers. But automation has also a job-creation effect: the option of automating an unfilled job vacancy boosts the present value of a vacancy, raising the incentive for firms to create vacancies. The net effect of automation on employment can be ambiguous, depending on the relative strength of the two opposing effects. Under our estimated parameters, automation amplifies employment fluctuations.
We also find that the threat of automation dampens wage increases in a business cycle boom. Since the net value of automation is procyclical, the probability of automation increases in good economic times, raising the firm's reservation value (i.e., the value of a vacancy) in wage bargaining, and therefore muting wage increases.
Increased automation in a boom also boosts aggregate productivity, further fueling the expansion. Since automation improves labor productivity while muting wage increases, it implies a countercyclical labor income share, as observed in the data. 3 3 Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) focus on the trend declines in the labor share since the mid-1970s for 59 countries. Their analysis attributes about half of the declines in the labor share to declines in the relative price of investment goods. Our model has implications for the cyclical dynamics of the labor share, instead of its trends.
Overall, automation helps generate large fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies relative to that in real wages. The threat of automation gives rise to a source of endogenous real wage rigidities, which are important for amplifying labor market fluctuations (Shimer, 2005) . In addition, automation raises aggregate productivity in a business cycle boom, further fueling the boom. This mechanism is quantitatively important. In our estimated model and the data, the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio (i.e., the v-u ratio), which is a measure of labor market tightness, is about 40 times that of the real wage rate. 4
In contrast, a counterfactual model without the automation mechanism produces a much smaller volatility ratio of about 9, less than 25 percent of that predicted by our estimated model. Furthermore, we show that search frictions are also important: a more competitive labor market tends to mitigate the real wage rigidity stemming form the threat of automation, making unemployment and vacancies less volatile. Thus, examining automation decisions within a search framework is important.
Although automation effectively weakens workers' bargaining power, its quantitative general equilibrium impact on the labor market cannot be reproduced in a counterfactual model with a lower worker bargaining power but without the automation mechanism. Absent the automation channel, reducing workers' bargaining power can amplify unemployment and vacancy fluctuations and dampen wage adjustments, yet these effects are substantially weaker than those in our benchmark model. In addition, the implied dynamics of wages are qualitatively different from those in our model with automation. For instance, in response to a positive discount factor shock, our model predicts a decline in the real wage, while it increases in the counterfactual model without automation and with a lower workers' bargaining weight. In addition, labor productivity rises in our benchmark model, which, couple with the fall in the real wage, leads to a fall in the labor share. In contrast, the labor share increases in the counterfactual model. These differences reflect the threat of automation on wage bargaining and the endogenous productivity changes through the automation channel.
Independent micro-level studies support our model's prediction that the threat of automation suppresses wage growth. For example, Arnoud (2018) examines occupation-level relations between the threat of automation and wage adjustments using data from the 2013 U.S. Current Population Survey and an index of automatability developed by Frey and Osborne (2017) . He finds that, controlling for observable characteristics, occupations that are more susceptible to automation have experienced lower wage growth, in line with our model's mechanism. Dinlersoz and Wolf (2018) present plant-level evidence that more automated establishments in the U.S. manufacturing sector have had a smaller fraction of high-wage workers, higher labor productivity, and a smaller labor share in production. Graetz and 4 Since we fit our model to these time series, the actual volatility ratio in the data is the same.
Michaels (2018) use a panel of robot adoptions within industries in 17 countries from 1993
to 2007 and find that adoption of industrial robots boosts labor productivity and also raises wages, although the positive effects on wages are much smaller than those on productivity. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) study U.S. county-level data and report a negative effect of robot adoptions on local wages.
While the empirical literature using disaggregated data is well suited to examine the impact of automation on different types of industries, jobs, and tasks, it is difficult to aggregate the micro-level effects into a macroeconomic impact. Our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model instead embeds the general equilibrium effects, although it does not directly speak to heterogeneous effects across different types of jobs or workers. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first quantitative general equilibrium model that incorporates automation decisions into a framework with labor search frictions to study the interactions between automation, bargaining power, and labor market fluctuations over the business cycle.
II. The model with labor market frictions and automation
This section presents a DSGE model that generalizes the standard DMP model to incorporate endogenous decisions of automation.
To keep automation decisions tractable, we impose some assumptions on the timing of events. In the beginning of period t, a job separation shock δ t is realized. Workers who lose their jobs add to the stock of unemployment from the previous period, forming the pool of job seekers u t . Firms carry over the stock of unfilled vacancies from the previous period, a fraction of which is automated by adopting robots. The stock of vacancies v t available for hiring workers consists of the remaining vacancies after automation, the jobs separated in the beginning of the period, and newly created vacancies. The job seekers (u t ) randomly match with the vacancies (v t ) in the labor market, with the number of new matches (m t ) determined by a matching technology. Production then takes place, with a homogeneous consumption good produced using either workers or robots. The unfilled vacancies and the pool of employed workers at the end of the period are carried over to the next period, and the same sequence of economic activities repeats in period t + 1.
Compared to the standard DMP model, our model introduces two new features. First, we replace the free-entry assumption in the DMP model with costly vacancy creation. Creating a new vacancy incurs a fixed cost e, which is drawn from an i.i.d. distribution F (e), as in Leduc and Liu (2019) . Thus, a vacancy has a positive value even if it is not filled by a worker. The number of vacancies becomes a slow-moving state variable (instead of a jump variable as in the standard DMP framework), enabling our model to match the persistent vacancy dynamics in the data. Second, we introduce endogenous automation decisions. In the beginning of period t, each firm draws a fixed automation cost x from an i.i.d. distribution G(x), the realization of which determines whether the firm will adopt a robot or post the vacancy for hiring a worker. If the automation cost lies below a threshold value x * t , then the firm adopts a robot and obtains the automation value, and the vacancy would be taken offline. If the automation cost exceeds the threshold, then the firm posts the vacancy for hiring a worker.
II.1. The Labor Market. In the beginning of period t, there are N t−1 existing job matches.
A job separation shock displaces a fraction δ t of those matches, so that the measure of unemployed job seekers is given by
where we have assumed full labor force participation and normalized the size of the labor force to one.
The job separation rate shock δ t follows the stationary stochastic process
where ρ δ is the persistence parameter and the term ε δt is an i.i.d. normal process with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ δ . The termδ denotes the steady-state rate of job separation.
The stock of vacancies v t consists of the unfilled vacancies carried over from period t−1 that are not automated, plus the separated employment matches and newly created vacancies.
The law of motion for vacancies is given by
where q v t−1 denotes the job filling rate in period t − 1, q a t denotes the automation rate in period t, and η t denotes the newly created vacancies (i.e., entry).
In the labor markert, new job matches (denoted by m t ) are formed between job seekers and open vacancies based on the matching function
where µ is a scale parameter that measures match efficiency and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of job matches with respect to the number of job seekers.
The flow of new job matches adds to the employment pool, and job separations subtract from it. Aggregate employment evolves according to the law of motion
At the end of period t, the searching workers who failed to find a job match remain unemployed. Thus, unemployment is given by
For convenience, we define the job finding probability q u t as
Similarly, we define the job filling probability q v t as
II.2. The firms. A firm makes automation decisions in the beginning of the period t. Adopting a robot requires a fixed cost x in units of consumption goods. The fixed cost is drawn from the i.i.d. distribution G(x). A firm chooses to adopt a robot if and only if the cost of automation is less than the benefit. For any given benefit of automation, there exists a threshold value x * t in the support of the distribution G(x), such that automation occurs if and only if x ≤ x * t . If the firm adopts a robot to replace the job position, then the vacancy will be taken offline and not available for hiring a worker. Thus, the automation threshold x * t depends on the value of automation (denoted by J a t ) relative to the value of a vacancy (denoted by J v t ). In particular, the threshold for automation decision is given by
The probability of automation is then given by the cumulative density of the automation costs evaluated at x * t . That is,
The flow of automated job positions adds to the stock of automatons (denoted by A t ),
which becomes obsolete at the rate ρ o ∈ [0, 1] in each period. Thus, A t evolves according to the law of motion
where q a t (1 − q v t−1 )v t−1 is the number of newly automated job positions. Once adopted, a robot produces Z t ζ t units of output, where Z t denotes a neutral technology shock and ζ t denotes an automation-specific shock. The neutral technology shock Z t follows the stochastic process
The parameter ρ z ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence of the technology shock. The term ε zt is an i.i.d. normal process with a zero mean and a finite variance of σ 2 z . The termZ is the steady-state level of the technology shock. 5 The automation-specific technology shock ζ t follows a stochastic process that is independent of the neutral technology shock Z t . In particular, ζ t follows the stationary process
The parameter ρ ζ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence of the automation-specific technology shock. The term ε ζt is an i.i.d. normal process with a zero mean and a finite variance of σ 2 ζ . The termζ is the steady-state level of the automation-specific technology shock.
Operating the robot incurs a flow fixed cost of κ a . The value of automation satisfies the Bellman equation
where the term κ a captures the costs of energy, facilities, and space for automated production, and D t,t+1 is a stochastic discount factor of the households.
If the automation cost exceeds the threshold x * t , then the vacancy will be posted in the labor market for hiring a worker. In addition, newly separated jobs and newly created vacancies add to the stock of vacancies for hiring workers. Following Leduc and Liu (2019) , we assume that creating a new vacancy incurs an entry cost e in units of consumption goods.
The entry cost is drawn from an i.i.d. distribution F (e). A new vacancy is created if and only if the net value of entry is non-negative. The benefit of creating a new vacancy is the vacancy value J v t . Thus, the number of new vacancies η t is given by the cumulative density of the entry costs evaluated at J v t . That is,
Posting a vacancy incurs a per-period fixed cost κ (in units of final consumption goods).
If the vacancy is filled (with the probability q v t ), the firm obtains the employment value J e t . Otherwise, the firm carries over the unfilled vacancy to the next period, which will be automated with the probability q a t+1 . If the vacancy is automated, then the firm obtains the automation value J a t+1 ; otherwise, the vacancy will remain open, and the firm receives the vacancy value J v t+1 . Thus, the vacancy value satisfies the Bellman equation
If a firm successfully hires a worker, then it can produce Z t units of intermediate goods.
The value of employment satisfies the Bellman equation
5 The model can easily be extended to allow for trend growth. We do not present that version of the model to simplify presentation.
where w t denotes the real wage rate. Hiring a worker generates a flow profit Z t − w t in the current period. If the job is separated in the next period (with probability δ t+1 ), then the firm receives the vacancy value J v t+1 . Otherwise, the firm receives the continuation value of employment.
II.3. The representative household. The representative household has the utility func-
where E [·] is an expectation operator, C t denotes consumption, and N t denotes the fraction of household members who are employed. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective discount factor, and the term Θ t denotes an exogenous shifter to the subjective discount factor.
The discount factor shock θ t ≡ Θt Θ t−1 follows the stationary stochastic process
In this shock process, ρ θ is the persistence parameter and the term ε θt is an i.i.d. normal process with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ θ . Here, we have implicitly assumed that the mean value of θ is one.
The representative household chooses consumption C t and savings B t to maximize the utility function (18) subject to the sequence of budget constraints
where r t denotes the gross real interest rate, d t denotes the household's share of firm profits, and T t denotes lump-sum taxes. The parameter φ measures the flow benefits of unemployment.
Denote by V t (B t−1 , N t−1 ) the value function for the representative household. The household's optimizing problem can be written in the recursive form
subject to the budget constraint (20) and the employment law of motion (5), the latter of which can be written as
where we have used the definition of the job finding probability q u t = mt ut , with the measure of job seekers u t given by Eq. (1). In the optimizing decisions, the household takes the economy-wide job finding rate q u t as given.
Define the employment surplus (i.e., the value of employment relative to unemployment)
, where Λ t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint (20) . We show in the Appendix that the employment surplus satisfies the Bellman equation
Λt is the stochastic discount factor, which applies to both the household's intertemporal optimization and firms' decisions.
The employment surplus has a straightforward economic interpretation. If the household adds a new worker in period t, then the current-period gain would be wage income net of the opportunity costs of working, including unemployment benefits and the disutility of working.
The household also enjoys the continuation value of employment if the employment relation continues. Having an extra worker today adds to the employment pool tomorrow (if the employment relation survives job separation); however, adding a worker today would also reduce the pool of searching workers tomorrow, a fraction q u t+1 of whom would be able to find jobs. Thus, the marginal effect of adding a new worker in period t on employment in period t + 1 is given by (1 − q u t+1 )(1 − δ t+1 ), resulting in the effective continuation value of employment shown in the last term of Eq. (23).
We also show in the appendix that the household's optimizing consumption-savings decision implies the intertemporal Euler equation
II.4. The Nash bargaining wage. When a job match is formed, the wage rate is determined through Nash bargaining. The bargaining wage optimally splits the joint surplus of a job match between the worker and the firm. The worker's employment surplus is given by S H t in Eq. (23). The firm's surplus is given by J e t − J v t . The possibility of automation affects the value of a vacancy and thus indirectly affects the firm's reservation value and its bargaining decisions.
The Nash bargaining problem is given by
where b ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining weight for workers.
Define the total surplus as
Then the bargaining solution is given by
The bargaining outcome implies that the firm's surplus is a constant fraction 1 − b of the total surplus S t and the household's surplus is a fraction b of the total surplus.
The bargaining solution (27) and the expression for household surplus in equation (23) together imply that the Nash bargaining wage w N t satisfies the Bellman equation
We do not impose any real wage rigidities. Thus, the equilibrium real wage rate is just the Nash bargaining wage rate. That is, w t = w N t .
II.5. Government policy. The government finances unemployment benefit payments φ for unemployed workers through lump-sum taxes. We assume that the government balances the budget in each period so that
II.6. Search equilibrium. In a search equilibrium, the markets for bonds and goods both clear. Since the aggregate bond supply is zero, the bond market-clearing condition implies that B t = 0.
Goods market clearing requires that consumption spending, vacancy posting costs, automation costs, and vacancy creation costs add up to aggregate production. This requirement yields the aggregate resource constraint
where Y t denotes aggregate output, which equals the sum of goods produced by workers and by robots and is given by
III. Empirical Strategies
We solve the model by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state. 6 We calibrate a subset of the parameters to match steady-state observations and the empirical literature. We estimate the remaining structural parameters and the shock processes to fit U.S. time-series data.
6 Details of the equilibrium conditions, the steady state, and the log-linearized system are presented in the appendix.
We focus on the parameterized distribution functions
whereē > 0 andx > 0 are the scale parameters and η v > 0 and η a > 0 are the shape parameters of the distribution functions. We set η v = 1 and η a = 1, so that both the vacancy creation cost and the automation cost follow a uniform distribution. 7 We estimate the scale parametersē andx and the shock processes by fitting the model to U.S. time series data.
III.1. Steady-state equilibrium and parameter calibration. Table 1 shows the calibrated parameter values. We consider a quarterly model. We set β = 0.99, so that the model implies an annualized real interest rate of about 4 percent in the steady state. We set α = 0.5 following the literature (Blanchard and Galí, 2010; Gertler and Trigari, 2009 ). In line with Hall and Milgrom (2008) , we set b = 0.5 and φ = 0.25. Based on the data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), we calibrate the steady-state job separation rate toδ = 0.10 at the quarterly frequency. We set ρ o = 0.03, so that robots depreciate at an average annual rate of 12 percent. We normalize the level of labor productivity toZ = 1 and automation-specific productivity toζ = 1.
We target a steady-state unemployment rate of U = 0.0595, corresponding to the average unemployment rate in our sample from 1985 to 2018. The steady-state employment is given by N = 1 − U , hiring rate by m =δN , the number of job seekers by u = 1 − (1 −δ)N , and the job finding rate by q u = m u . We target a steady-state job filling rate q v of 0.71 per quarter, in line with the calibration of den Haan et al. (2000) . The implied stock of vacancies
The scale of the matching efficiency is then given by µ = m u α v 1−α = 0.6594. We set the flow cost of operating robots to κ a = 0.98. Given the average productivitiesZ =ζ = 1, this implies a quarterly profit of 2 percent of the revenue by using a robot for production.
The steady-state automation value J a can then be solved from the Bellman equation (14).
Conditional on J a and the estimated values ofē andx (see below for estimation details), we use the vacancy creation condition (15), the automation adoption condition (9), and law of motion for vacancies (3) to obtain the steady-state probability of automation, which is given by
Our assumption of the uniform distribution for the vacancy creation cost is in line with Fujita and Ramey (2007) . We have estimated a version of the model in which we include the parameter η a in the set of parameters to be estimated. We obtain a posterior estimate of η a close to one and very similar estimates for the other parameters. For simplicity and for obtaining a closed-form solution for the steady-state equilibrium, we assume that η a = 1 in our benchmark model.
Given q a and v, the law of motion for vacancies implies that the flow of new vacancies is given by η = q a (1 − q v )v. The vacancy value is then given by J v =ēη. The stock of automatons A can be solved from the law of motion (11), which reduces to ρ o A = q a (1 − q v )v = η in the steady state. Thus, in the steady state, the newly created vacancies equal the flow of automated jobs that become obsolete. The law of motion for employment implies that, in the steady state, the flow of hiring equals the flow of separated employment relations.
With A and N solved, we obtain the aggregate output Y =Z(N +ζA). We calibrate the vacancy posting cost to κ = 0.0939, so that the steady-state vacancy posting cost is 1 percent of aggregate output (i.e., κv = 0.01Y ).
Given J v and J a , we obtain the cutoff point for robot adoption 
whereŪ data denotes the sample average of the unemployment rate in the data andÛ t denotes the log-deviations of the unemployment rate in the model from its steady-state value.
Similarly, we use demeaned vacancy rate data (also in log units) and relate it to the model variable according to
wherev data denotes the sample average of the vacancy rate data andv t denotes the logdeviations of the vacancy rate in the model from its steady-state value. Our vacancy series for the periods prior to 2001 is the vacancy rate constructed by Barnichon (2010) based on the Help Wanted Index. For the periods after 2001, we use the vacancy rate from the JOLTS.
In the data, we measure labor productivity by real output per person in the nonfarm business sector. We use the demeaned quarterly log-growth rate of labor productivity (denoted by ∆ ln p data t ) and relate it to our model variable according to
where ∆ ln(p data ) denotes the sample average of productivity growth, andŶ t andN t denote the log-deviations of aggregate output and employment from their steady-state levels in our model.
We measure the real wage rate in the data by real compensations per worker in the nonfarm business sector. We relate the observed real wage growth (denoted by ∆ ln(w data t )) to the model variables by the measurement equation
where ∆ ln(w data ) denotes the sample average of wage growth in the data andŵ t denotes the log-deviations of real wages from its steady-state level in the model.
III.2.2.
Prior distributions and posterior estimates. The prior and posterior distributions of the estimated parameters from our benchmark model are displayed in Table 2 .
The priors for the structural parametersē andx are drawn from the gamma distribution.
We assume that the prior mean of each of these three parameters is 5, with a standard deviation of 1. The priors of the persistence parameter of each shock are drawn from the beta distribution with a mean of 0.8 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The priors of the volatility parameter of each shock are drawn from an inverse gamma distribution with a mean of 0.01 and a standard deviation of 0.1.
The posterior estimates and the 90 percent probability intervals for the posterior distributions are displayed in the last three columns of Table 2 . The posterior mean estimate of the vacancy creation cost parameter isē = 8.60. The posterior mean estimates of the automation cost parameter isx = 1.80. These parameters imply a steady-state share of output produced by automation of A/Y = 0.24. Thus, our model implies that, in the long run, about 24 percent of the jobs will be performed by robots, which lies in the range of the estimates in the empirical literature (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018) . The 90 percent probability intervals indicate that the data are informative about the structural parameters.
The posterior estimation suggests that the shocks to both neutral technology and the discount factor are highly persistent, whereas the automation-specific shock is less persistent but more volatile. The 90 percent probability intervals suggest that the data are also informative for these shock processes.
IV. Economic implications
Based on the calibrated and estimated parameters, we examine the model's transmission mechanism and its quantitative performance for explaining the labor market dynamics. We also present some counterfactuals to illustrate the quantitative importance of both automation and labor market search frictions.
IV.1. The model's transmission mechanism. The equilibrium dynamics in our model are driven by both the exogenous shocks and the model's internal propagation mechanism.
To help understand the contributions of the shocks and the model's mechanism, we examine impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions.
IV.1.1. Impulse responses. Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of several key macro variables to a positive neutral technology shock in the benchmark model. The shock leads to persistent declines in unemployment and persistent increases in vacancies and hiring. The shock also raises the value of automation, leading to an increased probability of robot adoption, which raises the value of a vacancy and boosts the incentive for vacancy creation. The increase in vacancy value also strengthens the firm's bargaining power in wage negotiations, dampening the responses of real wages. Increased automation also raises labor productivity, reinforcing the initial expansionary impact of the technology shock. The increase in labor productivity, coupled with muted wage responses, implies persistent declines in the labor income share. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to a positive discount factor shock. The shock raises the present values of a job match, an open vacancy, and a worker's employment surplus.
Thus, it generates a persistent boom in employment, vacancies, and hiring. The shock also raises the value of automation and therefore increases the probability of robot adoption. The increased automation probability raises the vacancy value, incentivizing vacancy creation.
The increase in actual robot adoption raises labor productivity, further fueling the boom.
However, as the threat of automation rises, the workers' bargaining power weakens, leading to a modest short-run decline in the real wage. By boosting productivity and reducing the real wage rate, the discount factor shock generates a persistent decline in the labor share.
A job separation shock raises both unemployment and vacancies and mechanically boosts hiring through the matching function, as shown in Figure 3 . This finding is consistent with Shimer (2005) , who argues that the counterfactual implication of the job separation shock for the correlation between unemployment and vacancies renders the shock unimportant for explaining observed labor market dynamics. The shock reduces the automation probability.
Labor productivity increases slightly, since the decline in employment outpaces the decline in aggregate output. The shock also leads to small declines in real wages and the labor income share. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a positive automation-specific shock. The shock directly raises the value of automation. In turn, the increased probability of automation raises the vacancy value and boosts the incentive for vacancy creation. With more job openings, the job finding rate increases, raising hiring and reducing unemployment. Since a greater fraction of output is produced with robots, labor productivity improves. The increased threat of automation weakens the worker's bargaining power, leading to a decline in the real wage rate. The improvement in labor productivity and the reduction in the real wage rate result in a persistent decline in the labor income share.
IV.1.2. Forecast error variance decompositions. We now examine the unconditional forecast error variance decompositions for the four observable labor market variables used for our estimation. 8 Table 3 displays the results.
The variance decompositions suggest that fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies are mostly driven by the neutral technology shock and the discount factor shock. The neutral technology shock accounts for about one-third of the variances of unemployment and vacancies, and the discount factor shock accounts for about 60 percent. The job separation shock is not important for these labor market variables, consistent with Shimer (2005) .
The automation-specific shock does not directly contribute to the fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies; instead, the threat of automation works to amplify the effects of the other shocks, particularly the neutral technology and the discount factor shocks, by raising the probability of automation. These two shocks explain about 70 percent of the fluctuations in the automation probability (not shown in the table). As discussed in the previous section, the resulting procyclical threat of automation dampens real wage adjustments and thus magnifies the impact of the neutral technology and the discount factor shocks on labor market variables.
While the threat of automation dampens wage adjustments, the actual adoption of robots raises labor productivity. Through these channels, the automation-specific shock plays a quantitatively important role in driving fluctuations of the growth rates of both labor productivity and real wages. This shock accounts for about 32 percent of the variance of productivity growth and 37 percent of that of real wage growth. Perhaps not surprisingly, 8 We have also computed the conditional forecast error variance decompositions with forecasting horizons between 4 quarters and 16 quarters and found that they deliver the same message as the unconditional variance decomposition.
the neutral technology shock is also important for explaining the fluctuations in labor productivity, explaining about half of its variance. 9 In addition, about 62 percent of the real wage fluctuations are accounted for by shocks to the neutral technology and the discount factor.
IV.2. The role of automation in the propagation mechanism. To isolate the role of automation in driving labor market dynamics, we consider a counterfactual specification of "no automation," which is a version of our benchmark model with all automation-related variables held constant at their steady-state levels and with no automation-specific shocks.
To highlight the effect of the threat of automation on the worker's bargaining power in wage negotiations, we also compare our benchmark model's impulse responses to a version of the "no automation" case, in which we also reduce the bargaining weight for workers by a half (i.e., setting b = 0.25). We refer to this version of the model as the "low bargaining power" case. Figure 5 displays the impulse responses to a discount factor shock in the three models: the benchmark model (the black solid lines), the counterfactual with no automation (the blue dashed lines), and the counterfactual with no automation and a lower bargaining power for workers (the red dot-dash lines). These impulse responses suggest that the automation channel is a powerful amplification mechanism for labor market dynamics. Without automation, the counterfactual model implies much more muted responses of unemployment, vacancies, and hiring to the discount factor shock than those in the benchmark model. The responses of the real wage rate are also different: the counterfactual model implies a small increase in the real wage rate, whereas the benchmark model implies a modest decrease. This pattern suggests that the threat of automation is important for suppressing wage adjustments.
Without automation, labor productivity is solely driven by the neutral technology shock, so that productivity does not respond to the discount factor shock. With automation, as in our benchmark model, labor productivity rises following a discount factor shock, because the shock raises the value of automation and thus leads to increased adoption of robots. As a consequence, the labor income share rises in the counterfactual but falls in our benchmark model.
In the no-automation model, reducing workers' bargaining weight mechanically dampens real wage adjustments and thus should help amplify the responses of the unemployment and vacancy rates. This can be seen from the steady-state version of the Nash bargaining wage 9 In the standard DMP model without automation, labor productivity fluctuations would be entirely driven by the neutral technology shock. solution in Eq. (28):
Clearly, ceteris paribus, the Nash bargaining wage w N increases with the worker's bargaining weight b and decreases with the firm's reservation value J v . A reduction in b reduces the equilibrium wage, as does an increase in J v when firms have the option to automate.
However, the impulse responses shown in Figure 5 reveal that reducing the worker's bargaining weight is much less effective in amplifying labor market fluctuations than granting firms the ability to automate job positions. In addition, even if the worker's bargaining weight is reduced, the real wage rate still rises following the discount factor shock, leading to an increase in the labor share. In contrast, our benchmark model with automation implies a fall in the real wage and a persistent decline in the labor share.
The impulse responses to a neutral technology shock in these counterfactual models display similar patterns, as shown in Figure 6 . These impulse responses suggest that the automation channel is an important mechanism for amplifying labor market fluctuations and generating a countercyclical labor income share.
IV.3. The role of labor market search frictions in the propagation mechanism.
The model's amplification mechanism depends not only on automation, but also on labor market search frictions. To illustrate the importance of the search frictions, we consider a counterfactual version of the model which features low levels of labor search frictions. In particular, that counterfactual model has a smaller vacancy posting cost (of 0.5 percent of aggregate output in the steady state instead of 1 percent) and a higher average job separation rate (withδ = 0.5 instead of 0.1). 10 Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the macro variables following a positive neutral technology shock, and compares the impulse responses from the benchmark model (the black solid lines) with those from the counterfactual with low search frictions (the blue dashed lines). Although both models have the automation channel operating, the benchmark model produces much stronger amplification effects of the shock on unemployment and vacancies than does the counterfactual with low search frictions. As we have discussed, automation displaces jobs because robots and workers are substitutable inputs of production; meanwhile, automation also boosts job creation because the option of automating increases the present value of a job vacancy. In an economy with a spot labor market without search frictions, an employment relation would cease to be a long-term relation, and the option of automation 10 In the limit with κ = 0 and δ = 1, there is no vacancy posting cost and employment becomes a jump variable, approximating a spot labor market. We do not consider that extreme case to minimize deviations from our benchmark framework.
in the future would not directly affect current hiring decisions. In that case, robots would replace workers, and increased automation in response to a positive technology shock would raise unemployment and reduce vacancies. The counterfactual model with lower search frictions lies between our benchmark model and the spot labor market, with mitigated jobcreating effect of automation, and thus more muted responses in unemployment and vacancies than those in the benchmark economy. 11
With low search frictions, the present value of a vacancy responds less to the technology shock (because the model becomes closer to a spot labor market). Since the neutral technology shock directly raises the productivity of both workers and robots, the value of automation rises on impact. Thus, the automation threshold (i.e., x * t = J a t − J v t ) and the automation probability rises more sharply than in the benchmark model, as shown in Figure 7, leading to stronger increases in labor productivity. Although the real wage rate also increase more than that implied by the benchmark model, the productivity effects dominate, leading to a more pronounced and persistent decline in the labor share.
The importance of labor search frictions can be further illustrated by comparing the impulse responses following a positive automation-specific shock, as shown in Figure 8 . In the counterfactual model with low search frictions, the automation-specific shock raises unemployment and reduces vacancies because the direct job-displacing effect dominates the (mitigated) job-creating effect. In contrast, in the benchmark model, the same shock reduces unemployment and increases vacancies. As in the case with a neutral technology shock, the automation-specific shock directly raises the value of automation, while the counterfactual with low search frictions implies a more muted response of the value of vacancies. Thus, the automation probability, labor productivity and real wages all increase more sharply than those in the benchmark model.
The impulse responses shown in Figures 7 and 8 suggest that search frictions are important because they give rise to forward-looking hiring decisions, generating a job-creating effect of automation that would be otherwise absent in a spot labor market.
The results discussed in this section and those presented in Section IV.2, taken together, suggest that the automation channel interacts with labor search frictions, enabling our model to confront the time-series data of the U.S. labor market.
IV.4. Automation threat and labor market dynamics. Our model predicts that the threat of automation dampens wage adjustments and amplifies labor market fluctuations. Is the automation mechanism quantitatively important? To examine the empirical importance 11 We have also considered the case with a higher average job separation rate ofδ = 0.8 (not reported in the paper). In that case, we find that a positive neutral technology shock raises unemployment and lowers vacancies, because the forward-looking job-creating effect becomes further mitigated. of the automation mechanism, we compare our model's predictions for labor productivity and real wages with those from two counterfactuals: one without the automation channel and the other with low search friction. As discussed in Section IV.2, the no-automation counterfactual is a version of our benchmark model with the automation-related variables held constant at their steady-state values and the automation-specific shock shut off. The low search frictions counterfactual is a version of the benchmark model with a lower vacancy posting cost and a higher average job separation rate, as in Section IV.3.
In our model, the threat of automation mutes wage increases in a business cycle boom, allowing the model to generate large volatilities of the labor market tightness (the v-u ratio) relative to that of the real wage rate. In this sense, the automation channel helps resolve the Shimer puzzle.
Indeed, both automation and search frictions are important for generating the observed large relative volatility of the labor market tightness, as illustrated in Table 4 . The table
shows the standard deviations of the labor market tightness (i.e., the v-u ratio), the real wage rate (w), and the relative volatility of the tightness (relative to that of real wages). In the benchmark model, the v-u ratio is about 39 times as volatile as the real wage rate. This relative volatility is the same as in the actual data, because the model is estimated to fit these time series.
The counterfactual with no automation generates a much smaller volatility of the v-u ratio Our model's mechanism also sheds light on the driving factors for the muted wage growth over the past few years despite an increasingly tightened labor market. To assess the contribution of the automation mechanism to the observed dynamics of real wages and unemployment, we simulate a counterfactual model in which we shut off the automation channel, and into which we feed in the same parameters and shocks as those in our benchmark model. We then compare the smoothed time series generated from the counterfactual model with those from the benchmark model, the latter of which replicates the actual time series data under our Bayesian estimation. We find that, between 2013 and 2018, the automation mechanism has reduced the cumulative real wage growth by roughly 10 percent; it has also reduced the unemployment rate by an average of about 2.5 percentage points per year during the same period. Thus, absent automation, both the real wage rate and the unemployment rate would have been substantially higher during this period. In this sense, the automation mechanism has contributed significantly to the persistent declines in unemployment accompanied by sluggish wage growth in the recovery from the Great Recession.
V. Conclusion
We have studied the role of automation in explaining the observed labor market dynamics in a quantitative general equilibrium framework. The threat of automation raises the firm's reservation value in wage bargaining, dampening increases in real wages in a business cycle boom. Thus, automation creates a source of real wage rigidity. At the same time, the option to automate a job position boosts the incentive for job creation, which offsets the direct job-displacing effects of automation. By muting wage growth while improving productivity, automation helps amplify fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies.
Our estimated general equilibrium model shows that the automation channel is quantitatively important. The automation mechanism has contributed significantly to the observed sluggish wage growth despite strong labor markets during the long expansion following the Great Recession. More broadly, automation helps account for the large volatility in unemployment and job vacancies relative to that of real wages, a puzzling observation through the lens of the standard DMP model with labor search frictions.
Similar effects could also arise from other labor-saving mechanism, such as offshoring.
When firms have the option of importing intermediate goods instead of producing them domestically, the threat of offshoring could also weaken domestic workers' bargaining power in wage negotiations, similar to the threat of automation in our model. Other factors such as increases in product market concentration and declines in union powers may have also contributed to the observed labor market dynamics in the past few decades. Assessing the quantitative importance of these alternative contributing factors requires a coherent general equilibrium framework that can be used to fit time series data. Our framework with automation provides a useful step in that promising direction for future research. Figure 8 . Impulse responses to a positive automation-specific shock in the benchmark model (black solid lines) and the counterfactual with low search frictions (blue dashed lines).
Appendix A. Data
We fit the DSGE model to four quarterly time-series data of the U.S. labor market: the unemployment rate, job vacancies, real wage growth, and labor productivity growth. The sample covers the period from 1985:Q1 to 2018:Q4.
(1) Unemployment: Civilian unemployment rate (16 years and over) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, seasonally adjusted monthly series (LRUSECON in Haver).
(2) Job vacancies: For pre-2001 periods, we use the vacancy rate constructed by Barnichon (2010) 
subject to the budget constraint
and the law of motion for employment
where the measure of job seekers is given by
The household chooses C t , B t , and N t , taking prices and the average job finding rate as given.
Denote by Λ t the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint (A2). The first-order condition with respect to consumption implies that
The optimizing decision for B t implies that
The envelope condition with respect to B t−1 implies that
We thus obtain the intertemporal Euler equation
which is equation (24) in the text.
The envelope condition with respect to N t−1 implies that
Equations (A3) and (A4) imply that
and that ∂u t ∂N t−1 = −(1 − δ t ).
Define the employment surplus (i.e., the value of employment relative to unemployment) as
.
Thus, S H t is the value for the household to send an additional worker to work in period t. Then the envelope condition (A9) implies that
The employment surplus S H t derived here corresponds to equation (23) in the text, and it is the relevant surplus for the household in the Nash bargaining problem.
